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Abstract- We propose a secure video authentication algorithm
that is tolerant to visual degradation due to MPEG lossy compression to a designed level. The authentication process generates
a tag that is sent with video data and the level of protection can be
adjusted so that longer tags are used for higher security, and that
the protection is distributed such that higher security is provided
for regions of interest in the image. The computation required for
authentication and verification can he largely performed as part
of MPEG compression and so generation and verificatiun of the
tag can he integrated into the compression system. Calculation
of the tag can he parallelized and so made fast.

I. INTRODUCTION

which is part of MPEG compression algorithm and so
the proposed system can he effectively integrated into
MPEG.
2) The computation is parallelizahle and the system can be
used for real-time authentication of data.
3) The system provides flexible protection. It allows longer
MACS to he used for higher level of protection and
supports non-uniform protection; that is, selected parts
of an image can he protected to a higher level. This is
a useful property for protection of regions of interest in
images.

Section I1 gives an overview of MPEG. In Section III we
In many applications such as news reporting and surveildescribe
our system and show its properties. Section IV delance, the visual data must be authenticated. Visual data is
communicated in compressed form. A compression tolerant scribe the feature codes to construct a message authentication
authentication system will tolerate changes that are due to system and in Section V we analyze the security of this system.
lossy compression, while detecting other changes. Crypto- Section VI concludes the paper.
graphic authentication systems are sensitive to a single hit
change in data and so cannot he directly used for compression
11. MPEG COMPRESSION
tolerant authentication. In this paper we consider MPEG
tolerant video authentication systems.
A video compression standard MPEG [3] is a lossy comCompression tolerant video authentication systems can be pression system. In an MPEG video stream, the image sebroadly divided into feature ertraction systems and water- quence is encoded as a sequence of intra, forward predicted,
marking systems. In the former the authentication system and bidirectional prediction frames [41. An intra frame ( I extracts features (also called signature, digest or message frame) is encoded without reference to any other frames; a
authentication code (MAC)) of the video data that remain forward predicted frame (Plframe) is encoded relative to the
invariant through lossy compression to the given quality level. past reference I- or P- frame and a bidirectional prediction
An authenticated video stream consists of a compressed video frame (Blframe) is encoded relative to the past andor future
stream and a feature stream. In watermarking approach, a reference I- or P- frames.
fragile watermark [I]is embedded in the video data and the
A frame is divided into 16 x 16 macmblocks. A macroblock
watermark must be destroyed when the video is tampered consists of 4 luminance, and 2 chrominance 8 x 8 blocks
with. Reconciling fragility and compression tolerance is a for 4:2:0 chroma format and 4 chrominance blocks for 4:2:2
challenging task. Another disadvantage of the watermarking format. In an 1-frame, the transform coding is performed on the
approach is the degradation of quality due to the embedded macroblocks called intra macmblocks. Each of 8 x 8 blocks in
noise (i.e. the watermark).
an intra macroblock is transformed into 64 coefficients using
In this paper we propose a MAC system for video data DCT. This is followed by a scalar quantizer that replaces
that tolerate MPEG compression to a given quality level. We each DCT coefficient with an integer. Finally the 64 quantized
evaluate the effectiveness of the system by considering attacks coefficients are ”zig-zag” scanned and are entropy-coded. The
and show the best known attack is computationally expensive. macroblocks in P- and B- frame are either encoded as a motion
Although this does not prove security of the system in general vector and an ermr term between the macroblock and the area,
but gives an estimate of the cost against known attacks. The or intra-coded.
system has a number of attractive properties.
The information loss is primarily due to quantization. How1) The main computation of the system is computing the ever computation error also contributes to the difference heDiscrete Cosine Trnnsform (DCT) [2] of image blocks tween the values of a pixel, before and after the compression.
0-7803-8603-5/04/$20.00
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111. AN MPEG TOLERANT
AUTHENTICATION
SCHEME
FOR VIDEO DATA

We propose a message authentication code (MAC) that consists offeature codes which are obtained by encoding a linear
combination of DCT coefficients of subsets of blocks. The
MAC tolerates MPEG compression above a given compression
quality level.
A. Aurhenrication

8 x 8 pixel blocks in an I-frame are divided into subsets
and DCT coefficients in a subset is used to generate a feature
code.
In the following, we assume Ai(")ax non-negative integers
although the approach can also he used for arbitrary Ai(')
values. Let {G1,Gz ...Gp,m} be a partition of blocks assuming the subsets have m blocks each. Blocks in a group j
are labeled by 1 to m. The feature code generation algorithm
is as follows.
1) Find the DCT coefficients of each block.
2) Let Fi,j(") denote the DCT coefficient in position
(frequency) U of the ith block in G j . Then
=
CaiElm1
Ai(")Fi,j(') is the weighted sum of all coefficients in ~ ~ ( " 1 .
3 ) Afeature code is generated by encoding Yj(").
The correctness of the message authentication algorithm
follows from the observation that the value of a linear sum as
defined above, in the original image and its decompressed version, will remain 'close' and this closeness can be estimated.
Theorem 1, proved in [5] and re-stated here for completeness,
formalizes this statement. To state the theorem we need the
following notations.
Denote the set of integers {1,2,3,..., m} by [m]. Let
F ("I
%
= % = h,
r, be the DCC coefficient in position U
in block p , divided by the corresponding quantization scalar,
and -0.5 5 rp < 0.5.
The origjnal and reconstructed DCT coefficient values,
F,(") and F p ) ,are related as follows.

+

F,(")

Let k be a real number. Then $q = k(")+r(") and -0.5 5
r(") < 0.5 and the reconstructed value of k is k = k(")Q(").
For DC and AC coefficients we have the following two
theorems, respectively.
Theorem I: Let k he a real number and E he defined as above. Also let Yi(")
be as above, and %(") =
Cauiml
Ai(")$Y), and L = Cai+] IA;(")\.
and
are related as
Then for all j = 1,2, ...,g.
follows:
I ) If
= k,

5'")

- 0.5(1 +

lAi'")I))Q(")<

IAi(")l))Q(")
ViE(m1

2) If

%(")

< k,
< k(")Q(") +O.SQ(")(l +

1 lAi(")l)
V&[ml

3) If

q ( u ) > k,

y;'") >

- 0,5Q(")(1+

IAi(u)I)
Vi~[m]

Theorem 2: For any quantizer scale S E [l,311, the following condition is true.

Vic[ml

Then,
1) If I;(
<"
k,)
then

<k+

E&(")

&E[ml

2) Ify,(") = k, y.(d
3
- ss
sa& ( 4 Cvi+lIAi( "1

lAi(")l.

I<
- R&) 5

+ E&'")

qC"
CviElml
IAi(")I.
95 (4
3) If E;(") > k, then
> k - gQ
&iElml
I ) Fearure Code: A feature code IS a binary string which
represents %("I;
the length N(") of a feature code is the
accuracy @recision) of representation and determines the
interval of the acceptable quality level for MPEG compression.
Let [ F M ~ N ( F
" )M
, A ~ ( "be
) ) the range of the DCT coefficient
in position U, the sequence of hits ZjJ),Z&),
...,Zj$(ul represent the feature code for %("), and U ( N ( U )=
) FMIN(")
+

CN'"'(FMAX(~)
,=I
- FMI"(")).2-i . Zj:),
[u(N(")),u(N("))+ (FMA,(")

Then the interval

- F M ~ N ( ~ ) ) z - N ' " ' )satisfies

the following condition [51.

U ( N ( " ) ) 5 %("I
'

< U(N("))

+(FMAx(") - F ~ I N ( " ) ) 2 - " " ' .

2 ) Findin the Tolerance Interval: The difference between

=
RpQ(")
= h,Q('J) + rpQ(")
= rint(llp)Q(") = FP(")
-r,Q(")

(k(')

+ 0.5(1 +

q(")

viE[ml
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and
obtained from the decompressed image, is due
to the quantizarion error and calculation errors.
The quantization error A =
is the weighted
sum of m random variables, each corresponding to the
quantization error of a single coefficient. That is, A =
Ai(")& where Si =
- Pj,j("). Our experiments showed that this variable has a symmetric zero-mean
Gaussian-like distribution and its variance depends on the
frequency and quality level of the compression. For lower
quality levels and lower frequencies, the distribution of the
quantization error has a large variance and is close to the
uniform distribution.
The computation error is caused by inaccuracies introduced
during computation, including the finite precision calculations
used in the implementation of MPEG and other errors such
as those resulting from integer representation of real valued

y;'"'

$7)

coefficients. Let E$) E B denote the error in the reconstructed
value

$;'.

Then we have

=Tint(

F,.i
"

)Q(").

It can be shown [5] that the error in c(("(":s of the form

Cvic[ml
A;("'EI:). Let
such that -7(4

5

&ic[ml

&fi)

be a non-negative real number

ai("'^$) 5 d")For Gj("),j =

1 , 2 , ...,g and assume
has a normal distribution with zeromean. Then for large m,

and the errors will cancel out. However, using larger sums
reduces security of the system.

frames for at least 60 millisccond, we may leave out some of
the frames from the signature altogether. For example, in PAL
and NTSC systems, there are about 30 frameskecond, and so
each frame will be 30 milliseconds. This means that the MAC
needs to be calculated for every other frame.
An alternative to skipping a whole frame is to choose a
subset of blocks in each frame such that the union of the
subsets in consecutive frames cover the whole frame. For
example we may choose subsets as checkerboard pattern such
that alternate blocks are chosen in two consecutive frames.
This method will provide good protection assuming no major
change occur between two consecutive frames.

D. SARI Authentication Systeni
Lin and Chang [6] proposed an image authentication system
E. Verification
known as SARI, that was later extended to video authenticaTheorem 1 shows that the reconstructed linear sums will he tion [7], [8]. SARI can be considered as a special case of the
close to the values calculated from the original Frame. As long proposed system where m = 2 and Al("),Az(")are 1,-1,
as
is within the interval [ U ( N ) , U ( N ) ( F M A X ( ~ ) respectively, and so CViE[,,,]
IAi(")l = 2.
F , w I N ( " ' ) ~ - the
~ ) ,verification is successful. The verification
IV. KEYED HASHFUNCTION
tolerance E(u)2 0 for a given quality level e is obtained by
taking into account the quantization error and the computation
Feature codes can be seen as hash values of a frame.
error.
However, if all design parameters of the system are public,
Verification proceeds as follows. If all feature codes pass it will be easy to construct two frames with the same feature
the verification test, the image is considered authentic. To code. To provide collision resistance, some key information
choose E(') so that the quality level e is acceptable, must he introduced. The result will be a keyed hash function
assuming the computation error d"),we have E(u) <: or a message authentication code (MAC). The key information
aQt
95 (4 & I ~ I
IA;(")I+ d")where
is the maximum will be kept secret and shared by the authentication and the
value of &(") corresponding to the lowest MPEG quality level verification systems. Parameters of the system may be used
as the key are: i) m, the number of blocks in a group; ii)
that must be accepted by the system.
The composition of groups, G,("), j = 1 , 2 , 3 , ...,g; iii) S ,
C. Authentication of P- and B-frames
the set of protected Frequencies U; iv) Coefficients of the
Macrohlocks in P- and B-frames can be encoded as i) linear combination Ai("), i = 1 , 2 , 3 , ...,m; v) The precision
motion vectors and error terms, or ii) intra-coded macroblocks (number of bits) N(*) of the feature code for frequency U ;
and the method will depend on the bit-rate. The linear sums and vi) The error tolerance E(u).
of DCT coefficients will be used to authenticate decoded PThe composition of groups can he specified by an incidence
and B-frames too. However, if the same method as I-frames matrix, whose rows correspond to groups and columns correis used for all frames, then the MAC size will be large. In the spond to blocks. The matrix entries are 0 and I with 1 in ( i , j )
following, we consider methods of reducing the MAC size.
position showing that group i includes block j . We assume
I ) Reducing the MACSize: Since P- and B-frames depends groups have the same size. A larger size for a s o u p gives
on I-frames, more protection needs to be provided for I-frames. more flexibility to the attacker to modify a target block and
To reduce the MAC size, we may i ) reduce the number of spread the compensating change over the rest of the blocks
frequencies which are protected; ii) reduce the number of bits in the group. On the other hand larger groups mean that less
used for each frequency; and iii) reduce the number of blocks groups are needed to cover the whole image and so shorter
used for generation of the MAC. We will mainly consider iii) MAC will he produced. The number of blocks in a group
as i ) and ii) can always be used.
must be chosen by taking these conflicting requirements into
To reduce the number of blocks we may i) skip a frame account. Typical values are 8, 16, and 32.
completely, or ii) skip part of a frame. However these result
If groups are disjoint, the change in a block will affect
in unprotected frames and regions that might be exploited by one feature code. To spread the change in a block to other
the attacker.
blocks, groups must be linked. Two groups G; and Gj are
A video stream consists of a sequence of pictures. To linked if there is a sequence of groups Gi,G C +' ~
. .G j such
produce a visible change in the video, the attacker must modify that Gt Gt+l # 0,t = i, i + 1 , . .. ,j where i < j . We
a number of consecutive frames. To protect a video stream require that groups be linked.
against such attacks, it is sufficient to verify frames at a high
I ) Linear Combination Coeficients: Let AM IN(^) and
enough rate such that the visible changes become detectable. A M A X ( " denote
)
the maximum and the minimum value of
Assuming changes to frames will be applied on consecutive the linear combination coefficients and assume A;(") is chosen

+

-

Qp'

n

893

randomly from the interval [ A M I N ( ”A) ,M A X ( ” ) A
] . change
a in a DCT coefficient is multiplied by Ai(”) and so will
be magnified for high multipliers. If all regions of the image
have the same significance, then A;(”)must be chosen equal
or close to each other.
2) A Proposal for MAC; We choose the secret key information to be the mapping between the the incidence matrix and
the blocks in a frame. This means that the size of the key space
is p!. The system parameters such as precision of coefficients,
the number of groups, and the protected frequencies will be
determined by other considerations such as the length of the
M A C , and the quality level of the MPEG compression that
must be tolerated.

our results. These experiments show that local and global
modifications can be effectively detected for MAC sizes of
8K per frame for a 352 x 240 color MPEC stream. However
small modification may remain undetected if smaller MAC
sizes are used. To examine tamper detection property of the
system, we used a stream “table tennis” (Fig.1). The number
“3 1.47.48” on the poster was modified to “41.47.48.” in an Iframe (PSNR Red: 37.0 dB, Green: 37.0 dB, Blue: 38.3 dB).
The modification was detected by the system.

V. EVALUATION
OF THE MAC

3) Securig: We show an estimate of the cost of constructing a fraudulent frame that passes the verification test. The
cost of constructing a fraudulent video clip by using the best
known attack [9] is lower bounded by this. The analysis of
the system is using the following scenario.
An attacker has access to a video decoder which contains
the key in a tamperpmof device. He wants to modify a single
frame in an authentic MPEG stream. The attacker can input
various frame and MAC pairs and receive the response of the
decoder:
He will succeed if he can construct a frame and MAC pair
that is acceptable by the decoder. He does not know the blocks
in each group. To modify a chosen block the attacker has to
find other blocks in the same group and modify them such
that the change to the chosen block is compensated. If groups
are linked, a change propagates through all groups.
It can be shown [ 5 ] that the cost of finding all groups is
at most

C;=,(Q - ( m -m.1‘ ’‘ - ‘1)

verification operations

Fig. I. Tamper detection experiment: The original (left) and the modified
fnme (right).

VI. CONCLUSION
We proposed an MPEC tolerant video authentication system
with adjustable security, that can be efficiently incorporated
into the MPEG compression algorithm. The MAC consists
of a number of feature codes that can be carefully chosen to
protect regions of interest in the image and to various levels of
accuracy. MAC generation and verification are very efficient
and assuming the D C I coefficient are available, only requires
a small number of multiplication and addition.
We analyzed security of the MAC in a proposed attack
scenario and estimated the computational cost of attack under
the best known strategy. More formal modeling and analysis
of security remains a challenging open problem.
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